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The Ministry for State Security
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Ministry for State Security (MfS) - Summary
Brief definition
The Ministry for State Security was the secret police force, secret intelligence service and organ for criminal investigations, primarily in political criminal cases. It was virtually directed and controlled by the head of the SED, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, only.
Position in the system
The Ministry for State Security was the most important instrument used by the leadership of the SED to secure its dictatorship. It was accordingly designated the "shield and sword of the party". Even though it was a "ministry", it was not under the control of the chairperson of the Council of Ministers, but from 1960 on, it was under the control of the chairperson of the National Defense Council, who was at the same time Secretary-General of the SED. In the 1970’s, important issues with regard to the State Security Service were discussed directly between the SED Secretary General (Honecker) and the Minister (Mielke). The singular position of the MfS was also clear from the fact that it was responsible for monitoring both of the other security ministries (the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for National Defense) and in addition exerted significant influence on the Ministry for Justice (since it participated in the decision on the employment and promotion of public prosecutors).
Budget
The total MfS budget was secret in the GDR and was also in collusion vis-à-vis the pseudo-parliament (People’s Chamber) and the Council of Ministers. In 1989, the MfS budget included around 4.2 billion GDR marks, of which a good 3.5 billion was allocated from the national budget. The foreign exchange allocation in 1989 amounted to approx. 34 million valuta marks, i.e., DM, approx. 17 million €.
In 1989, the armed forces received approx. 13 billion marks from the national budget, the Ministry of the Interior (MdI) 3.3 for, among other things, police, riot police and emergency management.
As a result, of the so-called "armed organs", the MfS had a larger budget than the police force; the army had the largest budget of all.
In contrast to the theory that the GDR foundered commercially and financially due to the exorbitant costs of the security apparatus, the fact remains: from the point of view of the national economy and according to the budget, the costs of the SED social policy were higher (domestic construction, subsidies, etc.). In the era of Honecker, the GDR lived (socio-politically) well above its means.
Investigative organs
In the GDR, the investigative organs had the authority of police offices of investigation. They were authorized to open preliminary criminal proceedings and to carry out investigative operations, such as arrests, searches, detentions as well as interrogations, and – as it is called in the secret Statute of the State Secretary for State Security of October 15, 1953 – "to conduct all required investigations up to the final report to the judicial authorities". The preliminary proceedings in the GDR, however, were de jure under the administration of the public prosecutor, who had decisional authority in relation to the investigative authority within this framework.
Although the MfS was considered to be an overall investigative organ in the beginning, later on it was still only those areas, which conducted the criminal preliminary proceedings in accordance with GDR criminal procedure, Line IX in the Berlin MfS headquarters and/or in the district administrations that were designated as investigative organs.
The legal foundations of the work of the MfS as an investigative organ changed in the course of the 40 years of GDR-history, without an essential change to the basic structures.
The term “investigative organ” (Russian: sledstvennyj organ) is of Soviet origin. It gradually replaced the traditional term of investigative authority in the SBZ (Soviet Occupation Zone)/GDR and of the justice system in the course of the Sovietization of the police apparatus. In addition to the term,
“investigative organ”, from the 1960’s on the nearly synonymous term “justice administration authority” is also used in connection with the MfS.
MfS and SED
The Ministry for State Security was the most important instrument of the SED leadership to secure its dictatorship no later than with the construction of the Wall. To that effect, it was designated as "shield and sword of the party". Even though it was a "ministry”, it was not under the control of the chairperson of the Council of Ministers, but from 1960 on it was under the control of the chairperson of the National Defense Council, who was at the same time Secretary-General of the SED. In the 1970’s, important issues with regard to the State Security Service were discussed directly between the SED Secretary General (Honecker) and the Minister (Mielke). It was virtually directed and controlled by the head of the SED, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, alone.
In comparison to the situation in workshops or in normal civil administrations, the SED party organization in the MfS was shaped by special conditions:
- a very high portion of party members among the employees,
- the organizational principles of "individual military leadership" and of internal conspiracy.
- These peculiarities limited the scope of the MfS party organization, which could not exercise the normal "avant-garde function" with regard to non-members or control the work process in a concrete way. The SED had overwhelming educational functions in State Security; given the role of the MfS as the "shield and sword of the party", these had special significance. They included the exchange of political-ideological content as well as of discipline, motivation and other secondary virtues.
The SED was divided according to service units into basic organizations and "party organizations" (with large units such as the HV A – (Reconnaissance Administration)) in State Security as well as on the lower levels into party service unit organizations and party groups. The highest party body in the MfS headquarters in Berlin was a (non-territorial) district leadership, which was directly under the control of the Central committee. The Central Party Leaderships of the MfS district administrations were largely disconnected from the party apparatus of the headquarters and were under the control of the respective territorial SED district management. In the early years, this was not the case; until September, 1953 there was still a uniform party organization in the MfS.
The SED in the MfS supported its own party school as well as its own party court (District Party Control Commission) and in the end employed approx. 500 official party functionaries.
Human resources: official employees
From the beginning of the MfS, there were approximately 250,000 persons who worked officially at the MfS, of which approx. 100,000 were regulars ("Felix Dzierzynski" guard regiment, guard and back-up units, others)
On October 31st, 1989, 91,015 official employees were employed at the MfS including guard regiments, etc.; among these, 13,073 regulars.
Unofficial/societal employees/total strength
According to projections, a minimum of 600,000 unofficial employees (IM) were registered with the MfS from 1949 to 1989.
In December, 1988, according to MfS statistics, there were 174,000 IM and GMS (societal employees) (without HV A).
How many were GDR citizens and how many were foreigners was previously unknown.
Of Federal citizens, about 3,000 to 3,500 were registered as IM towards the end of the GDR (with HV A).
Military defense (Division I)
In contrast to many other societal areas, the Ministry for State Security hid its activities in the National People’s Army and the border patrols far less. The MfS was officially represented by an employee right at the physical examination of a draftee. In the troop units and facilities themselves, the talk was all about "Administration 2000", the internal army designation for the MfS Division I, about their VO (liaison officers) and occasionally about their military defense. The liaison officers wore the uniform of the troop unit that they had to process. In this way, they were able to move unhindered and inconspicuously.
The concentration of unofficial employees moved in a large span: it was rather slight in motorized marksmen-regiments, in areas with a high number of military secrets (missile and intelligence units, staffs) and quite high in the border troops. If someone was scheduled for employment in the so-called special troops and services as well as in the border troops, as a professional military trainee or as construction soldier, the MfS prepared a detailed security analysis.
The work of the HA I could be directed against a soldier as well as against a general. While the number of Operative Procedures and Operative Personal Checks is comparatively low, due to the permanent fluctuation of the draftees, there is on the other hand a comprehensive inventory of incidents and irregularities of all kinds.
MfS and Ministry of the Interior
The State Security and the People’s Police were supposed to work together to guarantee the internal security in the GDR. The SED leadership wished for a smooth collaboration in the different key activities of both organizations. The secret police and People’s Police followed the specifications of the party in anticipatory obedience, which resulted in an aligned action. The party head defined the aims and decided on the distribution of scarce resources (such as personnel), whereby the Mielke apparatus was allowed a leading position.
The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for State Security maintained official work contacts, which was a matter of course especially on the administrative level and was not disguised. This so-called "political-operative cooperation" applied to coordination in questions of principle and procedure based on a division of labor in relation to citizens, as with the repression of departure movement. In particular, the involvement of the K I in issues of the MfS allowed these to become "assistants" of State Security in many cases. In the Mielke apparatus, Line VII was primarily responsible for coordination with the People’s Police, specifically Subdivision 9 of Division VII.
The cooperation of both apparatus was useful; State Security had IM and GMS in the highest management levels of the People’s Police at their disposal. These contacts with individual employees were kept secret and served primarily for the surveillance of colleagues. The Mielke apparatus pushed for the advancement of its IM and GMS in the ranks of the People’s Police and left incapable directors at their posts, simply because they cooperated well with the secret police. However, not all IM "functioned" smoothly - many ran "out of the rudder", limited the dissemination of information to what was absolutely necessary or were uncovered by their colleagues. Indeed, "leaky positions" were expected within the People’s Police, but it was not known for the most part who the individual informers were.
The State Security Service indirectly influenced the control operations of superior administrative offices of the People’s Police and of the Security Division of the SED. When the administrative offices of the People’s Police were checked locally for functional efficiency and management problems, the State Security was already aware of the methodical as well as the short-term inspections through its IM network and was able to intervene accordingly.
State Security, in the process of "vetting", had to approve (or were able to refuse), when the People’s Police wanted to employ someone, promote employees into leading positions or send someone for professional training. For this purpose, the Mielke apparatus also investigated family members and friends of those concerned for "political, character, familial or other elements of uncertainty". In this way, the State Security Service significantly contributed to the fact that loyalty to the party line had priority over professional qualifications in the People’s Police.
The secret police were responsible for the surveillance of the People’s Police with regard to morality and world view. In the various service branches of the Ministry of the Interior, every thirtieth employee of the State Security targeted in OV or OPK (Operative Procedure and/or Control) was processed.
Many times, managers were let go due to an intervention of the State Security Service. Subdivision 1 of Division VII of the State Security was responsible for this on the highest level.
The main criticism targeted was the "maintaining, concealing, disguising and conspiring" of private contacts with the West, "sometimes over many years and with great intensity". As an example, the State Security attested to "in part, significant defects in management and leadership ability" for every second director in the K 1. Some even showed a "tendency to disassociation from the MfS" and possessed "reservations" in relation to the secret police. The dominance of the Mielke apparatus, the partial overlapping of the spheres of action, classic departmental egotisms as well as the different self-image of both organizations led to tensions, conflicts and defensive reactions from time to time.
Border controls
The MfS was represented at the points of entry with the passport control units of the so-called Line VI of the Ministry for State Security.
The main functions of the passport control units were the control of travel documents, search measures and the gathering of information of interest to the intelligence service.
However, several institutions with different functions were employed at the points of entry:
- the border troops of the NVA (Ministry for National Defense) for military protection of the border;
- the People’s Police (part of the Ministry of the Interior), which was responsible for the "pre-control" before the border crossing;
- the customs control (part of the customs authority, which was subordinate to the Ministry for Foreign Trade);
MfS members were not used directly in customs control, but the State Security monitored their colleagues through unofficial employees. The director of the customs authority from 1963 to 1989 was a Stasi officer on special assignment (OibE). The other institutions named above were also monitored with the assistance of unofficial employees.
SBZ/GDR death sentences
From 1945 to 1955, Soviet military tribunals pronounced at least 1,963 death sentences and carried out 1,201 death sentences.
From 1945 to 1989, SBZ/GDR courts pronounced 373 death sentences and carried out at least 208, 148 of these in 1956. Of the sentences executed, 52 were related to political offenses, 90 to Nazi criminals and 66 to general criminal acts.
As a rule, the MfS participated as an investigative organ in the political and NS proceedings, in the criminal proceedings only as an exception. The execution was incumbent on the penal institutions.
MfS murder
Murder plots of the MfS are preserved separately, in particular from the 1950’s and 1960’s. As an example, the case of the sergeant of the National People’s Army (NVA), Rudi Thurow, who had fled from border duty, may be named here.
As an example, the murder attempt on the escape agent Wolfgang Welsch and his family by means of poison has been proven.
For obvious reasons, orders for murder and their execution were not put into writing at least in the 1970’s and 1980‘s. Moreover, internal training records for the task forces of the MfS from the ‚70’s and ‚80’s, document that attempted murders were to be carried out in compliance with a high "concealment potential". Among others, the following methods were to be used for execution: simulated suicides and accidents, simulated criminal acts of violence and alleged terrorist attacks of violent left powers. For these reasons, there is still a question of participation by the MfS with some deaths, as with that of the soccer player Lutz Eigendorf, who fled from the GDR.
Senior officers
A senior officer (FO) is an MfS officer, who recruited IM, directed them himself, looked after them and elicited information from them in conversations. The latter was the main purpose of the FO-IM relationship. There were approximately 11,000 FO in the MfS, therefore approx. 13 % of the officials (without regulars).
In the early years, the average supervisory relationship was 1: 10 , later 1: 4-6.
Dissolution of the MfS/AfNS (Office for National Security)
Under the pressure of demonstrations in the autumn of 1989, the Ministry for State Security was redefined as the Office for National Security (AfNS) on November 18, 1989 through a resolution of the People’s Chamber, with which the new government was confirmed under Dr. Hans Modrow. Only a fraction of the members of the MfS personnel were supposed to belong to it and its responsibilities were also to be limited. On the other hand, the AfNS consisted exclusively of old managers and continued to work with the old records and IM. These are the reasons why the AfNS was also dissolved in the course of the revolutionary process at the beginning of 1990.
Intelligence services in comparison
1. Eastern Bloc
In principle, the structures and methods of operation in the Eastern Bloc were similar. The paradigm of the Soviet Union was followed, but with some national deviations. The most striking is the particular size of the MfS in the international scale, as measured by the population (1 official to 180 GDR citizens, compared to: USSR 1: 595).
In relation to the respective resident population, no intelligence service was as big as the MfS. However, this does not say much about the effectiveness or brutality of the repression carried out.
In contrast to the GDR, the Communist intelligence services in most other countries were not independent ministries, but were integrated in the interior ministries. The head of the intelligence service usually had the rank of a deputy minister of the interior.
2. Old Federal Republic and/or West
Commitment to the law
The commitment to the law is an essential difference. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the employees of the services must adhere to the law. When they collect evidence against a certain person, which is then brought into a criminal proceeding, this evidence is examined by an independent court.
In the GDR, the law was a servant of policy, which was determined by the SED apparatus. The employees of the State Security were to adhere to the laws, but only as long as they did not conflict with the higher political interests.
The political watchdogs
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the services of the ministry executives must be guided and controlled. Within the scope of the separation of powers, they must also answer to a parliamentary control commission of the Bundestag, in which the opposition is also represented.
In the GDR, the SED was the only watchdog, and was also the employer of the State Security as the "shield and sword of the party". However, as a rule, the SED apparatus did not have insight into all questions connected with the concrete secret police and intelligence service activity.
Responsibilities
Based on the lessons of the past, the services in the Federal Republic of Germany are subject to fundamental restrictions on authority: the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) may de jure not be employed domestically, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution may not be employed abroad. In contrast to the police, the services have no executive authority; this means, for example, that they may not arrest anyone.
The State Security of the GDR had none of these restrictions:
- The (foreign) intelligence service and "inner defense" were combined in one apparatus, the Ministry for State Security, and the individual service units were obligated to cooperate closely. So, for example, the espionage department (Headquarters A) supported the other service units in fighting internal opposition. The "defense" service units were also active in the West.
- The State Security had wide executive authority. It could not only arrest people, but also had its own remand centers, which in individual cases were even used for the enforcement of sentences.
- The limits of authority of State Security could not be openly disputed in the GDR, since there was no legal political opposition or independent media.
Quantity
The difference in the size of the respective services is already apparent: in 1989, the MfS of the GDR had 91,015 official employees; in the Federal Republic of Germany, the "services" together (the federal intelligence service, the federal and state offices for the protection of the constitution, military counterintelligence) had barely 15,000 employees.
In addition to this, the Federal Republic of Germany had a significantly larger population figure (1989 - 62 million) than the GDR (1989 - 16.4 million). The "concentration of intelligence" was correspondingly different:
- in the GDR, there was 1 official employee of State Security to 180 citizens,
- in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 employee of the services named to approximately 4,100 federal citizens.
MfS and KGB
The Ministry for State Security was established under strict instruction by the Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) and its forerunner organizations as the Ministry of the Interior (MWD).
In the following years (1953-1957), they were still very much present, but did not have the "supervisor role" anymore, outside of important operations primarily within the scope of counterespionage. In 1957, their number was reduced once more to a total of 37 "consultants".
The influence of the KGB naturally cannot be seen alone in the number of their officers in the MfS. Since the policy of the SED had to follow the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (KPdSU) to a large extent, the KGB somewhat determined the scope and direction of the activities of the MfS. Meetings took place at regular intervals at the central level and conferences of the service units with the same scope of duties.
There were "advisors", "consultants" and "liaison officers": since 1957, such officers for the most part in the rank of a colonel (plus interpreter, chauffeur, etc.) in the most important divisions and in the District Administrations of the State Security. In the HV A, there were even four liaison officers (as of 1986). It can be assumed that their principal duty must have been to ensure that all important information that the State Security gathered was forwarded to Moscow. In addition, there were, primarily in the direction of the West, joint "operations"; they probably played an important coordination role in their implementation.
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